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HOW ANTITRUST LOST ITS GOAL
Barak Orbach*
“In the sea, once upon a time, O my Best Beloved, there was a Whale, and
he ate fishes.”1

During the first seven decades following the enactment of the Sherman
Act, competition was the uncontroversial goal of antitrust.
The
introduction of the consumer welfare standard led to the dissipation of
“competition” as the goal of U.S. competition laws. This Essay explores
how antitrust lost the goal of competition and argues that this goal should
be restored.
The Essay reevaluates several influential antitrust
propositions. First, while “consumer welfare” was offered as a remedy for
reconciling contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust, the adoption of
the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring controversy, causing
confusion and doctrinal uncertainty. In effect, the consumer welfare
standard established the greatest antitrust paradox yet. Second, the smallbusiness interests hypothesis, which has often been used to explain the
enactment of the Sherman Act, is inconsistent with the well-documented
historical record. Third, the logic of Robert Bork’s consumer welfare thesis
requires restoration of “competition” as the goal of antitrust. The Essay
concludes with a straightforward observation: “consumer welfare” may
continue serving as the stated goal of U.S. competition laws but,
practically, antitrust has always been and will always be about the
preservation of competition.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. competition laws are known as “antitrust” because they were
designed as measures against the nineteenth-century trusts.2 In 1979,
quoting Robert Bork, the Supreme Court declared that “Congress designed
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”3 Since then,
“consumer welfare” has been the stated goal of U.S. competition laws.4
Federal antitrust statutes stress the significance of competition and appear
to declare the preservation of competition as their goal. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits agreements in “restraint of trade.”5 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act outlaws monopolization—that is, exclusion of competition.6
Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the Clayton Act ban price discrimination, tying, and
mergers that “may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to
create a monopoly.”7 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.”8 Indeed, antitrust inquiries
have always focused on competitive effects, or at least this has been their
perceived intent. Correspondingly, the preservation of competition in
business has always served as the most intuitive and obvious goal of
competition laws.9
Competition laws constitute one element of our regulatory system.10
What is the normative function of competition laws in this system? Could
it be anything other than the preservation of competitive markets?
Competition, however, is not the stated goal of antitrust law. It is not
even a meaningful contender as a potential goal in the debate over the goals
studied by this Essay. This debate has focused on several standards:
consumer welfare, total welfare, consumer surplus, total surplus, and
consumer choice. Competition has been largely excluded from this list in

2. See generally Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of
Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2012).
3. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
4. See generally Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
6. Id. § 2.
7. Id. § 18.
8. Id. § 45.
9. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND
EXECUTION 20 (2005) (“An antitrust statute that read[s] simply, ‘Unreasonable restraints on
competition are hereby forbidden,’ would do all the work . . . .”); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 260 (2d ed. 2001) (“An attractive alternative to . . . all . . . antitrust laws
would . . . be a simple prohibition of unreasonably anticompetitive practices.”).
10. See generally BARAK ORBACH, REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES
(2012).
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recent decades.11 Prior to the mid-1960s, there were occasional intellectual
inquiries into goals of antitrust. The broad understanding, however, had
been that competition was the original and practical goal of U.S.
competition laws, that is, antitrust. At some point in the late 1970s,
antitrust lost the goal of competition.
How did antitrust lose the goal of competition? This Essay explores this
question, and perhaps the more puzzling question of why the debate over
the goals of antitrust has largely ignored competition as a plausible or even
reasonable goal for U.S. competition laws. Finding that answer requires
navigating through several logical glitches in the history of antitrust
thinking. The starting point on this path is Robert Bork.
Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox12 influenced U.S. competition laws
in many ways, including framing the stated goal of antitrust. The Supreme
Court endorsed the consumer welfare standard, relying on The Antitrust
Paradox. For Bork, “consumer welfare” meant “allocative efficiency,”13
and “competition” meant “a shorthand expression for consumer welfare.”14
Thus, he recommended, as a policy prescription, the term “consumer
welfare” that allegedly “enables us to employ basic economic theory.”15
“Consumer welfare,” however, turned out to be an ambiguous and
confusing term.16
The introduction of the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring
conceptual controversy in antitrust with broad doctrinal implications.
While the term “consumer welfare” was offered to promote consistency and
certainty in the application of antitrust laws, the underlying economic
propositions of Bork’s thesis were flawed, and the adoption of the term as
the goal of antitrust resulted in an array of new inconsistencies. In the era
of consumer welfare, many antitrust standards “sail on a sea of doubt,”17
11. To be sure, several antitrust scholars have argued that competition is or ought to be
the goal of antitrust. The argument, however, has not played a significant role in the
controversy. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Dwight R. Lee, Private Interest Support for
Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 218 (1992); Gregory J. Werden,
Competition, Consumer Welfare & the Sherman Act, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87 (2008). Alan
Meese’s discussion of “competition on the merits” in section 2 of the Sherman Act is
essentially about the goals of antitrust. Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare
Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare
Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); see also Alan J.
Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 78
(“Everyone knows that antitrust law should protect and further ‘competition.’”).
12. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
13. Id. at 98.
14. Id. at 61.
15. Id.
16. Antitrust economics does not accommodate welfare analysis, although it may
accommodate surplus analysis. See generally Orbach, supra note 4.
17. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898)
(warning that the “relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness of restraints
of trade,” namely, the adoption of the rule of reason standard, was to “set sail on a sea of
doubt”). For an expression of uncertainty in antitrust, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN
ACT vii (2008) (“Competition and consumers are best served if section 2 standards are

2256

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

since the meaning of “consumer welfare” is ambiguous at best. No court
has ever seriously addressed the meaning of the term.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act has been studied thoroughly
during the past century. There is broad agreement today, if not consensus,
that the record does not support the historical claims that led to the adoption
of the consumer welfare standard. This Essay’s premise is that the
historical record and the nature of the debate over the goals of antitrust are
known. For simplicity, this Essay addresses only parts of the record needed
to explore the role of competition as a goal of antitrust.
The inquiry in this Essay consists of two parts. Part I explains how
Congress enacted competition without addressing the merit of competition.
This part describes the simplistic economic understanding at the end of the
nineteenth century, when “no trusts” meant “competition.” The rise and
persistence of the consumer welfare standard illustrate why legislative
intent may not be a desirable approach for modern law. But to the extent
that any court will ever reconsider the legislative history of the Sherman
Act, the Essay argues that, considering the common economic
understanding in 1890, antitrust legislation effectively meant intent to
preserve competition. In 1890, people distinguished between markets
controlled by trusts and markets without restraints of trade (i.e.,
competition), where many sellers operate. Part II shows that competition
was understood as the goal of antitrust until the introduction of the
consumer welfare standard. It also presents the peculiar history of the
consumer welfare standard in antitrust.

sound, clear, objective, effective, and administrable. After more than a century of evolution,
section 2 standards have not entirely achieved these goals, and there has been a vigorous
debate about the proper standards for evaluating unilateral conduct under section 2.”).
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THE FOG
PUCK, November 22, 1911 (depicting the uncertainty that the Sherman Act created for
businesses).
I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING
In his 1914 study of the Sherman Act, William Howard Taft argued that
the “members of Congress who passed [the Sherman Act] made plain the
object that they had in mind, and they used general expressions to
accomplish it, which they thought had had definition in the existing law.”18
“The evil to be remedied was manifest,”19 and the confusion, Taft
maintained, was created later when the statute became “a football of party
politics” and “[p]oliticians . . . seized upon phrases that would attract the
public eye, the meaning of which in the law they [did] not themselves
underst[and].”20 The confusion established by biased reconstruction of
antitrust laws has indeed obscured the understanding of the goals of
antitrust.

18. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1914).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
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PUCK, November 22, 1911 (the cover of the 1911 Thanksgiving Issue). A prescription from
“Taft, M.D.” to the trusts—“You must go on a strict diet cut out all rich food”—deprives the
trusts of the restraint-of-trade feast, leaving them with the thin soup of competition.21

A. Who Drafted the Sherman Act?
Under a certain statutory interpretation philosophy, which Robert Bork
advanced, legislative intent can be inferred from the remote past and should
direct courts today.22 Adhering to this philosophy, the Supreme Court
21. In 1911, the Taft Administration concluded two of the government’s most epic
antitrust battles with the break of Standard Oil and the American Tobacco Company.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
22. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case
Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 217, 223 (2010) (“Judge Bork’s attention to the original understanding of the
Sherman Act and the Court’s embrace of that view brought order to antitrust law, and
originalists have since applied that method to other areas of law.” (citation omitted));
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adopted the consumer welfare standard as the goal of antitrust, believing
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare
prescription.’”23 Our inquiry begins with the plausibility of this belief.
Who drafted the Sherman Act? What was the legislative intent of the
members of the 51st Congress that passed it? The enactment of the
Sherman Act involved a lengthy, multiphase process. The individuals who
secured its passage engaged in substantial committee work, delicate
negotiations, the usual political deals and compromises, and inevitable
political quarrels. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 52 to 1, with 29
Senators absent.24 It passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 242
to 0, with 85 members choosing not to vote.25 The overwhelming public
support for the anti-trust bill made voting against it a risky choice for
politicians with aspirations for reelection.26 It would be naïve to attribute a
single intent to Congress in such a complex process.27
Many scholars and courts have used the statements of Senator Sherman
(R-Ohio) to interpret the Sherman Act. For example, in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America28 (Alcoa), Judge Learned Hand attributed great
significance to the fact that “[i]n the debates in Congress Senator Sherman
himself . . . showed that among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a
desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the
helplessness of the individual before them.”29 Similarly, Robert Bork
insisted that “[Senator] Sherman was the prime mover in getting antitrust
legislation considered and pressed through the Senate.”30 Accordingly,
Bork’s explicit research premise was that the “views of Senator Sherman
. . . [were] crucial to an understanding of the intent underlying the law that
bears his name.”31 But, as Hans Thorelli pointed out, “[t]hat Sherman was

Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1990) (“Bork fail[ed]
to produce convincing reasons why society should want its judges to adopt originalism as
their interpretive methodology in constitutional cases.”).
23. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
24. 21 CONG. REC. 3153 (Apr. 8, 1890).
25. Id. at 6314.
26. Senator Rufus Blodgett (D-New Jersey), who voted against the bill, was not a
candidate for reelection. During the debate over the Sherman Act he served as a railroad
executive. See Ex-Senator Blodgett Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1910, at 11.
27. See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) (“Looking
simply at the history of the [Sherman] bill from the time it was introduced in the senate until
it was finally passed, it would be impossible to say what were the views of a majority of the
members of each house in relation to the meaning of the act. . . . All that can be determined
from the debates and reports is that various members had various views, and we are left to
determine the meaning of this act, as we determine the meaning of other acts, from the
language used therein.”).
28. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
29. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
30. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, 14, 45–47 (1966).
31. Id. at 14. Bork acknowledged that the Judiciary Committee “completely rephrased”
Sherman’s bill, but argued that “the final bill, in its substantive policy aspects, embodied
Sherman’s views.” Id. at 14–15.
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not the author of the act is clear to any intelligent reader of the
Congressional Record.”32
Although Senator Sherman introduced two antitrust bills and was a
strong supporter of antitrust legislation, he was critical of the antitrust bill
that bears his name. He barely voted for it. When the final bill was brought
to the Senate for a vote, Senator Sherman stated:
I do not intend to open any debate on the subject, but I wish to state that,
after having fairly and fully considered the amendment proposed by the
Committee on the Judiciary, I shall vote for it, not as being precisely what
I want, but as the best under all the circumstances that the Senate is
prepared to give in this direction. Therefore, without enlarging or
entering into debate, I shall vote for the proposition of the Judiciary
Committee as it stands.33

In 1890, it was transparent to the public that, while Senator Sherman
introduced anti-trust bills,34 the drafting of the final bill and the political
persuasion were done by others. For example, after the Senate voted for the
bill, The Washington Post wrote: “As the bill went to the Judiciary
Committee it was a Sherman bill; as it came back from the Judiciary
Committee it was principally an Edmunds bill.”35 The Washington Post
further explained Sherman’s ethical struggle: “The Ohio Senator accepted
the situation with the best grace he could.”36 Other newspapers printed a
statement that Senator Sherman released in which he used much stronger
language, denouncing the “substitute for the Sherman bill” and stating that
it would be “totally ineffective in dealing with combinations and Trusts.”37
Senator Sherman was so disappointed in the substitute for his bill that he
stated that he was “giv[ing] up hope of seeing any legislation . . . [capable
of coping] with the Trust evil.”38
Senators George Edmunds (R-Vermont) and George Hoar (RMassachusetts) were the principal drafters of the statute we know today as
the Sherman Act.39 The two were members of the Judiciary Committee that
redrafted the anti-trust bill. Edmunds chaired the Committee. Other
members of the Committee, such as Senator George Vest (D-Missouri),
also contributed to the drafting and passage of the bill. Their statements are

32. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN
AMERICAN TRADITION 211 (1954) (emphasis added).
33. 21 CONG. REC. 3145 (Apr. 8, 1890).
34. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1st Sess. 1889); S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1st Sess. 1888).
35. The Anti-trust Bill, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1890, at 4. Senator George Edmunds (RVermont) chaired the Judiciary Committee.
36. Id.
37. Mr. Sherman Gives Up Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1890, at 4 (quoting Senator
Sherman).
38. Id. (quoting ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT).
39. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 94–95 (1965); Felix
H. Levy, The Federal Anti-trust Law and the “Rule of Reason,” 1 VA. L. REV. 188, 188
(1913); see also Mr. Sherman Gives Up Hope, supra note 37.
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consistent with Sherman’s statements: They felt that it was odd that the
celebrated statute was called the “Sherman Act.”40
Thus, although Senator Sherman earned historical credit for inspiring the
congressional campaign that led to the enactment of the first federal
antitrust statute, he did not draft the bill passed by Congress nor did he like
it much.41 His views of competition laws cannot seriously be considered
the “legislative intent” of the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, many scholars and courts have used statements from the
debate over Senator Sherman’s bill—which Congress did not pass—to infer
Congress’s legislative intent in passing the Judiciary Committee’s bill.42
Robert Bork was one of these scholars. He argued that the policy of the
first bill “was carried forward into the Judiciary Committee’s draft and
enacted.”43 Senator Sherman and members of the Judiciary Committee
clearly did not feel this way. Senator Sherman’s perspective did not reflect
the legislative intent of the Sherman Act.
Indeed, any “intelligent reader of the Congressional Record” ought to be
aware of the discrepancy between the title of the Sherman Act and its
history.44 Many antitrust scholars and practitioners are familiar with this
history.45 The notion that one can extract from the Congressional Record
“legislative intent” that has not been considered before is somewhat
implausible. It was also implausible when the Supreme Court adopted the
consumer welfare standard with no analysis, departing from the Court’s
long-established understanding of the goal of antitrust laws.
B. The State of Economic Thinking in 1890
Senator Sherman’s anti-trust bills proposed that “all arrangements,
contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . made with a view, or
which tend, to prevent full and free competition . . . or . . . designed, or
which tend to advance the cost to the consumer” would be void.46 When
the Judiciary Committee returned the revised bill on April 2, 1890, it no
longer contained the word “competition.”47 By passing the Sherman Act,
the 51st Congress enacted competition law without talking about
40. See, e.g., 36 CONG. REC. 522 (Jan. 6, 1903) (statement of Senator Hoar) (“It was so
called . . . lucus a non lucendo, because Mr. Sherman had nothing to do with it whatever.”);
id. at 523 (statement of Senator Hoar) (a similar comment); 2 GEORGE F. HOAR,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 363 (1903) (discrediting Sherman’s role in the drafting
of the “1890 law” and ridiculing its common name); Vest Talks on Tariff, WASH. POST, Dec.
25, 1902, at 3 (“It is odd that the name of the late Senator Sherman should be coupled to a
measure which he conspicuously opposed and refused to vote for.”).
41. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 210–14.
42. For the conceptual flaws of this approach, see id. at 214–19.
43. Bork, supra note 30, at 45.
44. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 211.
45. In 1902, the U.S. Attorney-General Office published a book that organized and
indexed the Congressional Record. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, BILLS AND DEBATES IN
CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS (1902).
46. S. 1, 51st Cong. (1st Sess. 1889); S. 3445, 50th Cong. (2d Sess. 1888).
47. 21 CONG. REC. 2901 (Apr. 2, 1890).
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competition.48 The members of Congress undoubtedly intended to address
the “trust problem,” but their lack of direct discussion of the merits of
competition is puzzling.
Under public pressure, the 51st Congress debated anti-trust legislation.
Many members of the Congress, although not all, were hostile to “trusts and
combinations,” expressing determination to relieve the public from their
burden. It is far from clear that all lawmakers fully understood the
economic meaning of “anti-trust legislation.” At the time, the “trusts
problem” generally meant restraints of trade, high prices, limited
production, low wages, losses to small businesses, and other forms of
perceived economic oppression. “No trusts” generally meant a state of
competition, freedom from restraints of trade, low prices, better conditions
of supply, and prosperity opportunities. “Competition” was an abstract
concept that generally meant absence of restraints of trade.49 For example,
before the Senate voted on the Judiciary Committee’s bill, Senator Hoar
stated: “The great thing that this bill does, except affording remedy, is to
extend the common-law principles, which protected fair competition in
trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce
. . . .”50
Senator Sherman, the drafters of the Sherman Act, and other lawmakers
unequivocally expressed a desire to fight trusts and combinations through
legislation.51 They were convinced that the United States would do better
without them because of the belief that in a state of competition, where
there are many businesses, prices are low and production is high. They did
not question these premises and had no analytical tools to do so.52
The economic thinking of the members of the 51st Congress was not far
behind that of economists at the time. The concepts of “price,” “rent,” and

48. THORELLI, supra note 32, at 225–32.
49. See generally id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989).
50. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (Apr. 8, 1890) (statement of Senator Hoar) (emphasis added).
51. In his 1903 autobiography, Senator Hoar stated that the concern that motivated him
in drafting the “law of 1890” was “the grave evil of the accumulation . . . of vast fortunes in
single hands.” 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 363. Hoar criticized the Supreme Court’s strict
interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, noting that the Judiciary Committee expected
courts to treat the “words ‘agreements in restraint of trade’ as having a technical meaning,
such as they [were] supposed to have in England.” Id. at 364; see also TAFT, supra note 18,
at 2 (arguing that the enactment of the Sherman Act “was a step taken by Congress to meet
what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable evil”). In 1890, Taft served as the
U.S. Solicitor General. For a general analysis of the “trust problem,” see Wayne D. Collins,
Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279 (2013).
52. At least formally, both the Democrats and Republicans denounced the trusts. In
August 1888, a day after Senator Sherman introduced his first antitrust bill, James G. Blaine,
a prominent Republican politician, criticized President Cleveland’s concerns regarding the
“danger” of the trusts. Blaine ridiculed the Democrats’ approach to the trusts, stating that
the trusts are “largely private affairs with which neither President Cleveland nor any private
citizen has any particular right to interfere.” Mr. Blaine’s Work Begun, NY TIMES, Aug. 16,
1888, at 2. Blaine’s speech was shortly before the 1888 elections and drew a lot of negative
publicity to which the Republican Party responded by a formal denouncement of the trusts.
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“competition” were still in rudimentary form. Economists used and wrote
about them but in an intuitive manner.53
In 1898, Irving Fisher published the translation of Cournot’s celebrated
work on the mathematical principles of economics.54 Using Cournot’s
simplistic framework, economists tied market shares to market power,
developing formal explanations for monopolists’ power over prices.55 This
analytical framework was not available in 1890. Rather, when Congress
debated the Sherman Act, economists sharply distinguished between trusts
(monopoly) and competition.56 Some prominent economists, like John
Bates Clark, defended the trusts and monopolies, expressing confidence in
the effectiveness of potential competition and other theories.57 Overall, it is
fair to state that, when Congress considered the Sherman Act, American
economists mostly held an intuitive understanding that monopolies lead to
high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many
sellers drives prices down.58 With such intuitions, the protection of small

53. See, e.g., Frank T. Carlton, Price and Rent, 26 Q.J. ECON. 523 (1912); J.H.
Hollander, The Concept of Marginal Rent, 9 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1895); John Ise, Monopoly
Elements in Rent, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 33 (1940); C. W. MacFarlance, Rent and Profit, 5
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 90 (1894); Alfred Marshall, On Rent, 3 ECON. J. 74
(1893); see also LETWIN, supra note 39, at 71–77 (reviewing the dominant positions among
American economists about competition, monopoly, and trust when the Sherman Act was
enacted); George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
ECON. 1 (1957) (reviewing the history of the term “competition” and noting that it “entered
economics from common discourse, and for long it connoted only the independent rivalry of
two or more persons.”); Robert H. Wessel, A Note on Economic Rent, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
1221 (1967) (reviewing the confusion surrounding the concept of “economic rent”).
54. AUGUSTINE COURNOT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHÉMATIQUES DE LA
THÉORIE DES RICHESSES (1838); Irving Fisher, Cournot and Mathematical Economics, 12
Q.J. ECON. 119 (1898). Fisher’s wife’s brother-in-law translated the book. Fisher added
notes to the publications. See Irving Fisher, Cournot Forty Years Ago, 6 ECONOMETRICA 198
(1938). In 1927, The MacMillan Company started publishing the translations and notes as a
book that became very popular. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1927);
see also A.J. Nichol, Tragedies in the Life of Cournot, 6 ECONOMETRICA 193 (1938)
(describing the delayed influence of Cournot).
55. See, e.g., Orbach & Rebling, supra note 2, at 633–39; Stigler, supra note 53, at 5–6.
56. See, e.g., Richard T. Ely, Competition: Its Nature, Its Permanency, and Its
Beneficence, 2 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 55 (1901) (addressing the meaning of “competition”
as the President of the American Economic Association). In 1935, Frank Knight was still
highly critical of the concept of competition, arguing that “[t]he critical reader of general
economic literature must be struck by the absence of any attempt accurately to define that
competition which is the principal subject under discussion.” FRANK HYNEMAN KNIGHT, THE
ETHICS OF COMPETITION 41 (1935).
57. See, e.g., JOHN BATES CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS v (1901); John Bates Clark,
Trusts, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 182 (1900); J.B. Clark, The “Trust”: A New Agent for Doing an
Old Work: Or Freedom Doing the Work of Monopoly, 16 NEW ENGLANDER & YALE REV.
223 (1890). By 1914, Clark acknowledged that the “potentiality of unfair attacks by the trust
tended to destroy the potentiality of competition.” JOHN BATES CLARK & JOHN MAURICE
CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS vii (rev. ed. 1914).
58. See Paul J. McNulty, A Note on the History of Perfect Competition, 75 J. POL. ECON.
395, 395 (1967); Mary S. Morgan, Competing Notions of “Competition” in Late NineteenthCentury American Economics, 25 HIST. POL. ECON. 563 (1993).
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businesses may seem to serve competition. Small businesses allegedly
contributed to competition, as it was understood at the time.
Over the years, some commentators identified in the Congressional
Record modern economic concepts that are too nuanced to be extracted
from the abstract thinking of the late nineteenth century.59 Most
prominently, the consumer welfare standard emerged from such attribution
of contemporary meaning to phrases that the members of Congress used
while discussing the trust problem.60
C. Under the Shadow of the Great Tariff Debates
The nineteenth century misunderstanding of basic economic principles
cannot be overstated. Some context can illustrate why modern concepts
and intuitions do not apply to the thinking of the members of the 51st
Congress.
The first Sherman bill was introduced in the background of the “Great
Tariff Debate of 1888”61 and was considered in the shadow of a heated
controversy over tariff bills. The tariff debates stressed the rents that the
nineteenth-century trusts extracted through protectionist policies that
affected consumer prices and the cost of living as a whole. The tariff
debates also highlighted the contrast between two concepts that were
associated with the trusts—“free trade” with foreign nations that the trusts
used political influence to stifle and “restraints of trade” that the trusts
developed and preserved.
In the late 1880s, the pressing problem that troubled the United States
was a growing fiscal surplus—national revenues exceeded expenditures by
over 40 percent.62 Congress believed that changes to the tariff policy were
necessary to address the problem. The Democrats proposed reductions in
existing tariffs to foster competition, lower prices for consumers, and
elimination of protectionism. The Republicans argued that tariff reductions
59. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989). For a
general discussion of economic thinking in the second-half of the nineteenth century see
SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865–1901 (1956).
60. See Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Reexamination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82–106 (1982) (explaining why the
Congressional Record does not support the consumer welfare thesis).
61. Representative William Springer (D-Illinois), who chaired the Committee of the
Whole, named the debate. 19 CONG. REC. 6519 (July 14, 1888) (statement of Rep. William
Springer) (“This debate will perhaps be known as the most remarkable that ever occurred in
our parliamentary history. It . . . shall be known as ‘The Great Tariff Debate of 1888.’”).
This description of the Great Tariff Debate of 1888 draws from JOANNE REITANO, THE
TARIFF QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE: THE GREAT DEBATE OF 1888 (1994); 2 EDWARD
STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 192–295
(1903).
62. Douglas A. Irwin, Higher Tariffs, Lower Revenues? Analyzing the Fiscal Aspects of
“The Great Tariff Debate of 1888,” 58 J. ECON. HIST. 59, 59 (1998).
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would stimulate imports, thereby increasing government revenues, harming
American industries, and adversely affecting local wages.
The
Republicans, therefore, proposed tariff increases to reduce government
revenues and protect American industries from foreign competition.
In December 1887, President Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, delivered
his third State of the Union Address (then called an “Annual Message”).63
Cleveland dedicated his entire address to the tariff laws, which he described
as a “vicious, inequitable, and illogical source of unnecessary taxation.”64
The President further explained that the “primary and plain effect [of the
tariff laws was to] raise the price to consumers” of all imported goods.65
“[T]he increase of the cost of living,” he argued, “caused by such tariff
becomes a burden upon those with moderate means and the poor, the
employed and unemployed, the sick and well, and the young and old, and
that it constitutes a tax.”66 The President explained that competition among
local producers sometimes had a positive effect on prices. He pointed out,
however, that “it is notorious that this competition is too often strangled by
combinations . . . frequently called trusts.”67
President Cleveland’s address sparked the Great Tariff Debate of 1888.
Congress spent much of 1888, until the presidential election, debating a
tariff bill. Senator Sherman introduced his first anti-trust bill during this
period.68
The 1888 elections indeed focused on the tariff policy. The Democratic
platform pledged tariff reductions,69 arguing that “domestic industries and
enterprises should not and need not be endangered by the reduction and
correction of the burdens of taxation.”70 The Democratic platform
expressly argued that the high tariffs served the trusts at the expense of the
public: “Judged by Democratic principles, the interests of the people are
betrayed when, by unnecessary taxation, trusts and combinations are
permitted to exist, which, while unduly enriching the few that combine, rob
the body of our citizens by depriving them of the benefits of natural
competition.”71
The platform of the Republican Party included an unequivocal pledge to
protectionism: “We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American
system of protection; we protest against its destruction as proposed by the
President and his party. They serve the interests of Europe; we will support

63. President’s Annual Message, 19 CONG. REC. 9 (Dec. 6, 1887).
64. Id. at 10. It was the first time in U.S. history that the President devoted the State of
the Union Address to a single topic. Stanwood, supra note 61, at 226.
65. President’s Annual Message, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (2d Sess. 1888).
69. THOMAS HUDSON MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL
POLITICAL PARTIES: 1789 TO 1904, at 233, 235–36 (5th ed. 1904).
70. Id. at 235.
71. Id.
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the interests of America.”72 Notably, at the same time, the Republican
Party also denounced the trusts and declared unequivocal support for antitrust legislation:
We declare our opposition to all combinations of capital, organized in
trusts or otherwise, to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among our
citizens; and we recommend to Congress and the state legislatures . . .
such legislation as will prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the
people by undue charges on their supplies, or by unjust rates for the
transportation of their products to market. We approve the legislation by
Congress to prevent alike unjust burdens and unfair discriminations
between the states.73

In November 1888, U.S. voters elected the 51st Congress that passed the
Sherman Act. The Republican Party scored a big victory, taking the White
House and the two chambers of Congress. Much of the first session of the
51st Congress was dedicated to debates over the Tariff Act of 1890—the
“McKinley Act,”74 which was passed on October 1, 1890. Congress also
debated and passed the Sherman Act during this period.75 The McKinley
Act substantially raised tariffs, but it did not accomplish the hoped-for
result: revenues from imported goods that were subject to duties
increased.76
The Republican Party controlled the drafting and championed the
passage of the Sherman Act. Its members saw no inconsistency between
anti-trust legislation and protectionist policies that strengthened the trusts.
They expressly dismissed the notion that pro-trust protectionism affected
prices to the consumer.77 Reflecting on the first years of the Sherman Act
in 1903, Senator Hoar argued that there was “no time” to deliberate the
Sherman Act because of the pressure “to get it through.”78 Hoar
acknowledged that the enactment of the statute required significant
compromises, but stressed that a remedy for “evils from the trusts” was
needed. He believed that this had “been accomplished.”79
In sum, it may be fair to state that the members of the 51st Congress did
not fully understand the significance of the Sherman Act, although they
understood that its effects on trusts would be meaningful for the American
economy, and they intended to serve the public—consumers and
competitors of the trusts.
72. Id. at 240.
73. Id. at 241.
74. See ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
75. See ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
76. Irwin, supra note 62, at 70.
77. Thomas Hazlett identified in the inconsistency between the tariff policy and the
antitrust legislation support for the position that “the Sherman Act was not part of generally
pro-consumer campaign to remedy market power in the U.S. economy.” Thomas W. Hazlett,
The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined, 30 ECON. INQ. 263, 273 (1992).
Rather, he argued that it was a “political compromise” that “was not thought to do much
more than codify and federalize the common law.” Id.
78. 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 366.
79. Id.
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D. The Small-Business Interests Hypothesis
During the past three decades, a line of influential academic publications
has established a belief that Congress enacted the Sherman Act to serve the
interests of small, less-efficient businesses that could not compete with the
trusts.80 Some of the most frequently cited works that allegedly support the
argument make modest claims related to the potential role of interest groups
in the political process but do not propose that the Sherman Act was
enacted to serve small interest groups.81 The small-business interests
hypothesis is no more plausible than the consumer welfare standard. It
mostly builds on out-of-context quotes of lawmakers’ concerns for
competitors of the trusts.
Political debates are noisy, reflecting diverse interests and producing a
wide range of allegations and statements.82 During the enactment of the
Sherman Act, Congress expressly debated pro-trust protectionism.
Proponents of pro-trust protectionism controlled Congress and, in fact,
drafted the Sherman Act. The small-business interests hypothesis isolates
certain statements and arguments made during these debates that could be
interpreted as support for small-business protectionism. It is a simplistic
hypothesis that reduces a complex political and economic history into a
one-dimensional explanation.83
In the late nineteenth century, politicians often considered harm to small
businesses as an indication of the harm that the trusts inflicted on the
economy.
For example, Senator Hoar’s speeches, letters, and
autobiography reflect a strong conviction that the “grave evil of the
accumulation . . . of vast fortunes in single hands” affected the American
people and required remedy.84 To illustrate this point, Senator Hoar wrote
in his autobiography: “It is said that one man in this country has acquired a
fortune of more than a thousand million dollars by getting an advantage
over other producers or dealers . . . .”85 Similarly, in one of the debates in
the House of Representatives, Congressman William Mason charged that
80. See, e.g., Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group
Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985); Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago
Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQ. 242 (1992); George
J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985); Werner Troesken, The
Letters of John Sherman and the Origins of Antitrust, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 275 (2002).
81. Most notably, George Stigler presented a simple quantitative study that offers
“modest support for the view that the Sherman Act came from small business interests or
that opposition came from areas with potential monopolizable industries, or both.” Stigler,
supra note 80, at 7. Stigler’s findings are also consistent with the explanation that, in areas
where the trusts were powerful, politicians were less likely to support antitrust legislation.
His findings do not identify the nature of the political pressure.
82. See generally Barak Orbach & Frances R. Sjoberg, Excessive Speech, Civility
Norms, and the Clucking Theorem, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2011).
83. It is only fair to note that the starting point of at least some of the papers that
advanced this hypothesis was that “antitrust laws . . . often hinder rather than improve
economic efficiency.” DiLorenzo, supra note 80, at 73.
84. 2 HOAR, supra note 40, at 363.
85. Id.
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the trusts had “destroyed legitimate [business] competition and [drove]
honest men from legitimate business enterprises.”86 But Hoar, Mason, and
others did not enact the Sherman Act to serve the interest of small
businesses. Rather, they believed that the trusts were “robbing” all
segments of society, including small businesses.

Homer Davenport, 1890 (depicting the perceived effect of the trusts on national prosperity).

II. THE TRANSITION FROM “COMPETITION” TO “CONSUMER WELFARE”
In 1890, Congress passed a competition law without meaningfully
talking about competition. In 1979, the Supreme Court revised the standard
of competition regulation without talking about competition or the
implications of the revision. Both transitions involved the use of popular
phrases that, at the time, had significant political capital. In 1890, the
phrase was “anti-trust,” and in 1979 it was “consumer welfare.” In 1979,
per Robert Bork’s prescription, antitrust was reframed to resolve the
confusion created by the word “competition” through the use of the phrase
“consumer welfare.” Alas, the prescription’s underlying logic was circular,
and its confusing consequences could have been anticipated.

86. 21 CONG. REC. 4100 (May 1, 1890) (statement of Rep. William Mason); DiLorenzo,
supra note 80, at 80–81.
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A. The Decline of Competition
The 1955 report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws opened with a simple statement: “The general objective
of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open markets.”87 The
Committee further stated that the antitrust legislation established a “policy
‘against undue limitations on competitive conditions.’”88 Indeed, until the
introduction of the consumer welfare standard in the mid-1960s, the notion
that competition was the goal of U.S. competition laws appeared to be
Prominent antitrust thinkers, including Thurman
uncontroversial.89
Arnold,90 Donald Dewey,91 Milton Handler,92 Richard Hofstadter,93 Alfred
Kahn,94 Carl Kaysen, and Donald Turner,95 described competition as the

87. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1955).
88. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
89. See, e.g., Corwin D. Edwards, Can Antitrust Laws Preserve Competition?, 30 AM.
ECON. REV. 164 (1940) (discussing the ability of antitrust laws to preserve competition).
90. Thurman Arnold, The Economic Purpose of Antitrust Laws, 26 MISS. L.J. 207
(1955).
91. Donald Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L.
REV. 413, 414 (1964) (“[T]he whole history of antitrust policy can be read as the judicial
quest for a working definition of competition.”).
92. MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 3 (1957) (“The Sherman Law gave
birth to no new principle. Congress merely affirmed its faith in competition as the principle
regulating force in our economy.”); TEMPORARY NAT’L ECON. COMM., INVESTIGATION OF
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 1 (1941) (“[By legislating the Sherman Act,
Congress] sought to preserve competition from the extinction which threatened it.”).
93. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 195 (1965) (explaining the “idea of competition as a means of social regulation—as
an economic, political, and moral force” that emerged in the late nineteenth century and
stood behind the enactment of the Sherman Act).
94. See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Market Power and Economic Growth: Guides to Public
Policy, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 531 (1963).
95. CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 18–19 (1959) (“If there has been any persistent policy and approach, it has been
that of protecting competitive opportunities and competitive processes. . . . It is obvious that
in passing the Sherman Act, ‘Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to
protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’”); Donald Turner, The American
Antitrust Laws, 18 MODERN L. REV. 244, 244 (1955) (“When the U.S. Congress passed . . .
the Sherman Act—in 1890, American business became subject to a governmentally enforced
policy of competition. Sixty-five years later, that Act is still the central core of American
economic philosophy. . . . Protection of competition is the accepted policy.”). Professor
Turner noted:
Antitrust law is a pro-competition policy. . . . [T]he primary function of
antitrust law is to protect and promote such procompetitive conduct, not to protect
individual competitors as such.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws also suggests
“populist” goals—social and political reasons for limiting business size and
preserving large numbers of small businesses and business opportunities. . . . [I]t
is questionable whether populist goals are appropriate factors to consider when
formulating antitrust rules. The pursuit of these goals would broaden antitrust’s
proscriptions to cover business conduct that has no significant anticompetitive
effects, would increase vagueness in the law, and would discourage conduct that
promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or proved.
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unquestionable goal of antitrust. Antitrust courts also repeatedly referred to
competition as the goal of U.S. competition laws.96 The famous exception
is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Northern Securities Co. v.
United States,97 where he stated that the Sherman Act “says nothing about
competition.”98 But Justice Holmes never “disguise[d] [his] belief that the
Sherman Act [was] a humbug based on economic ignorance and
incompetence.”99
In April 1978, a year before the Supreme Court adopted the consumer
welfare standard, the Court handed down its decision in National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States (NSPE).100 The NSPE decision
addressed the argument that “a learned profession” could impose
restrictions on competition among its members “for the purpose of
minimizing the risk that competition would produce inferior . . . work
endangering the public safety.”101 Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul
Stevens dismissed the argument, stating that “the statutory policy precludes
inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.”102 He
Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75
CAL. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
96. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978)
(“[By enacting the Sherman Act] Congress . . . sought to establish a regime of competition as
the fundamental principle governing commerce in this country.”); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination,
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.”); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
330 (1962) (“[A]ntitrust laws . . . are intended primarily to preserve and stimulate
competition.”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act
was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. . . . [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the
Act is competition.”); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248–49 (1951) (“The heart of
our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition. In the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, ‘Congress was dealing
with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.’”
(quoting A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)); Bd. of Trade of
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”); N. Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904) (“[T]he anti-trust act[] has prescribed the rule of free
competition among those engaged in [interstate] commerce.”) .
97. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
98. Id. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he court below argued as if
maintaining competition were the expressed object of the act”).
99. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Sir Frederick
Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 163 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1942). In the early years of the Sherman Act, some judges insisted that it
concerned only involuntary restrictions on individual liberty and said nothing about
competition. See Hovenkamp, supra note 49, at 1032–33.
100. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
101. Id. at 681.
102. Id. at 695.
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explained that “[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that
ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services.”103 Justice Stevens went further, holding that, under
antitrust law, competition analysis is narrow and does not include welfare
effects. In his words:
In our complex economy the number of items that may cause serious
harm is almost endless—automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components,
heavy equipment, and countless others, cause serious harm to individuals
or to the public at large if defectively made. The judiciary cannot
indirectly protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly
privileges on the manufacturers.104

Put simply, the NSPE Court indirectly, but quite explicitly, rejected the
consumer welfare thesis. The NSPE Court, however, mostly stated the
Supreme Court’s traditional understanding of antitrust. It did not offer any
analysis of the goals.
The status of competition as the goal of antitrust faded until it vanished
following the introduction of the consumer welfare standard. When Robert
Bork launched his critique of antitrust in a 1963 essay with Ward Bowman,
they depicted antitrust as a “policy of preserving competition.”105 Bork and
Bowman explained that “we want to preserve competition . . . . [because it]
provides society with the maximum output that can be achieved at any
given time with the resources at its command.”106 Bork and Bowman,
therefore, considered competition to be the goal of antitrust.
The Bork-Bowman essay drew attention and criticism.107 Defending
their position and advancing his critique of antitrust, Robert Bork argued in
a different article that he and Bowman were troubled by “two very different
theories [in antitrust] of how competition may be injured.”108 From that
point, he developed the thesis that antitrust courts had been inconsistently
using the concept of “competition,” frequently contradicting each other.
Summarizing his antitrust framework in the 1978 Antitrust Paradox,
Bork dismissed the usefulness of the word “competition” in antitrust: “The
fact that judges, like the rest of us, have used the word to mean very
different things has resulted in the fruitless discourse of men talking past
each other.”109 He, therefore concluded that “[p]art of the confusion about
103. Id.
104. Id. 695–96.
105. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec.
1963, at 138, reprinted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363 (1965) (emphasis added); see also
Symposium, Re-evaluation of the Impact of Present-Day Antitrust Policy on the Economy,
23 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 288, 319–23 (1963) (Bork describing the role of competition
in antitrust policy).
106. Bork & Bowman, supra note 105, at 365.
107. See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 377 (1965).
108. Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 401
(1965).
109. BORK, supra note 12, at 58.
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[the] goals [of antitrust] arises from the ambiguity of the word
‘competition’ . . . .”110 Phrased differently, Bork posited that the concept of
“competition” is too ambiguous to be used as the goal of competition law.
This proposition has been effectively governing antitrust law since 1979.
Frank Knight, one of the founders of the Chicago School of Economics,
was a critic of the use of the word “competition” in economics and argued
that the word lacked any clear definition.111 Bork’s critique of the word
“competition” in antitrust is quite similar. Bork identified five meanings of
the word “competition” that antitrust courts allegedly had been using:
(1) the process of rivalry, (2) the absence of restraint over a person’s
economic activities by another person, (3) perfect competition as defined in
economics, (4) “fragmented industries and markets,” and (5) “any state of
affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an
alternative state of affairs through judicial decree.”112 Bork concluded that
we are “compelled” to accept the fifth meaning, finding that “[t]he
legislative history of the Sherman Act . . . displays the clear and exclusive
policy intention of promoting consumer welfare.”113 The inevitable
conclusion was that “competition” is “a shorthand expression for consumer
welfare.”114 Bork’s claims sparked the controversy over the goals of
antitrust law.
Legal rules, including precedents lag behind developments in economics
(and other sciences). Observing this pattern in antitrust, but depicting it as
an irresponsiveness of antitrust law to economics, Bork charged that “[t]he
life of the antitrust law . . . [is] neither logic nor experience but bad
economics and worse jurisprudence.”115 Until the mid-1960s, antitrust
jurisprudence was indeed deficient. But since the mid-1960s, the consumer
welfare controversy has itself been an even greater impediment to the
development of antitrust jurisprudence. This stated goal of antitrust—its
core concept—is foreign to antitrust economics. Thus, Bork’s own words
offer a conclusion: “If I am correct, reform is needed, but it need not come
from Congress. Antitrust policy is determined . . . by the Supreme
Court.”116 The Supreme Court should reconsider the consumer welfare
standard it erroneously adopted.
B. The Emergence of the Consumer Welfare Standard
The phrase “consumer welfare” entered common use after the Great
Depression. The frequency of its use in American publications fluctuated
until the early 1970s and then skyrocketed with the social regulation
110. Id.
111. KNIGHT, supra note 56, at 41.
112. BORK, supra note 12, at 58–61 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962)).
113. Id. at 61.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 242 (1967).
116. Id.
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revolution.117 Robert Bork introduced the consumer welfare thesis before
the phrase “consumer welfare” acquired political significance in the United
States. For Bork, the phrase “consumer welfare” meant “allocative
efficiency.”118 A few years after Bork presented his thesis of the legislative
intent of the Sherman Act, the phrase “consumer welfare” acquired a
popular cultural meaning referring to the buyer’s well being: the benefits a
buyer derives from the consumption of goods and services, or more
casually, the individual’s well being.119 This meaning is not equivalent to
allocative efficiency, of course.

Source: Google Ngram120

In the mid-1970s, when the phrase “consumer welfare” was gaining
popularity, Robert Bork served as the U.S. Solicitor General. In 1977,
toward the end of his term, the Ninth Circuit, in Boddicker v. Arizona State
Dental Ass’n,121 reasoned that serving the public is the goal of the Sherman
Act.122 The court supported this claim with a footnote that stated: “In an
exhaustive study of the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act,
Professor Robert H. Bork, the current Solicitor General of the United
States, concluded [that the] ‘legislative history [of the Sherman Act]
contains no colorable support for application by courts of any value,
premise or policy other than the maximization of consumer welfare.’”123 In
other words, the Ninth Circuit effectively equated Bork’s consumer welfare
with the public welfare.
117. “Social regulation” addresses externalities, including aspects of antidiscrimination,
consumer protection, workplace safety, and environmental preservation. See generally
ORBACH, supra note 10, at 275–77. In 1970, Richard Posner published a paper about
“antitrust policy and the consumer movement.” This paper echoed changes in the
perceptions of “consumer welfare.” See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Consumer Movement, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 361 (1970).
118. BORK, supra note 12, at 98.
119. See Orbach, supra note 4, at 137–42.
120. For the methodology and its limitations, see Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., Quantitative
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176 (2011).
121. 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977).
122. Id. at 632.
123. Id. at 632 n.10 (citing Bork, supra note 30, at 10).
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By the end of the 1970s, the phrase “consumer welfare” had gained
substantial political capital. In 1979, in Reiter v. Sonotone,124 the Supreme
Court examined the question of whether consumers who paid higher prices
as a result of antitrust violations were injured within the meaning of section
4 of the Clayton Act. The Petitioners argued that consumers have standing
under antitrust laws and can recover treble damages.125 In support of their
position they cited the footnote from the Boddicker.126 The federal
government filed an amicus brief in support of the Petitioners.127 The
government took the position that the “primary purpose of the Sherman Act
was consumer protection.”128 It supported this position with quotes from
the Congressional Record that referred to consumers and prices.
Concluding the argument, the government wrote that “‘[t]he Sherman Act
was clearly presented and debated as a consumer welfare prescription.’”129
The Supreme Court adopted the claim and declared: “Congress designed
the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”130
Frank Easterbrook, for whom The Antitrust Paradox was “a legal
blueprint,”131 served as a Deputy Solicitor General and signed the
government’s amicus brief as one of its authors.132 In his academic writing,
Easterbrook argued that, “[h]owever you slice the legislative history, the
dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges.”133 He
believed that courts “should do their best to have a sensible, consistent
program. That means a single goal, for a program,” and warned that
“[g]oals based on something other than efficiency (or its close proxy
consumers’ welfare) really call on judges to redistribute income.”134
Notwithstanding, with this conceptual framework, Easterbrook also
declared that “[t]he goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of
competitive markets.”135
The record, therefore, shows that Bork’s incorrect equation of “consumer
welfare” with “efficiency” and “competition” lies at the foundation of
“consumer welfare” as the goal of antitrust. In Reiter, with no discussion,
124. 442 U.S. 300 (1979).
125. Brief for Petitioners, Reiter, 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (No. 78-690), 1979 WL 213491.
126. Id. at *13.
127. Brief for the United States As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Reiter, 442 U.S.
330 (1979) (No. 78-690), 1979 WL 213494 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
128. Id. at *12.
129. Id. at *15 (citing BORK, supra note 12, at 66).
130. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343 (citing BORK, supra note 12, at 66).
131. George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition,
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2009).
132. Brief for the United States, supra note 127, at *i. The petitioners cited a different
sentence from Bork’s writing: “‘[T]he legislative history, in fact, contains no colorable
support for application by courts of any value, premise or policy other than the maximization
of consumer welfare.’” Brief for Petitioners, supra note 125, at *13 (citing Bork, supra note
30, at 10).
133. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703
(1986).
134. Id. at 1703–04.
135. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
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the Supreme Court adopted “consumer welfare” as a new standard for
regulation of competition, effectively replacing the original standard of
“competition.”
Since Reiter, “consumer welfare” is the stated goal of the U.S
competition laws. What it means we do not know.136 The phrase
“consumer welfare” has mostly served as a source of debate among antitrust
scholars but has no accepted meaning in antitrust. The history of the
consumer welfare standard undermines its validity and its rationalization
defies common sense.
CONCLUSION
The legislative intent of the Sherman Act does not support Bork’s
consumer welfare thesis. Nevertheless, for more than three decades
antitrust courts have been referring to “consumer welfare” as the original
purpose of the Sherman Act and its present goal, while scholars have been
debating the meaning of the phrase.
The origins of the consumer welfare standard are in the argument that the
concept of “competition” is too confusing to serve as the goal of U.S.
competition laws. This perceived confusion led to a convoluted set of
propositions that resulted in “consumer welfare” as a policy prescription for
antitrust because it “enables us to employ basic economic theory.”137 The
alleged rationale, like its underlying propositions, has no foundation in
established economics. If anything, “consumer welfare” has been a source
of confusion and controversy in antitrust. While offered as a remedy for
reconciling confusion and contrasts in antitrust, the introduction of the
consumer welfare standard effectively placed antitrust at war with itself.
In 1993, Robert Bork supplemented The Antitrust Paradox. He declared
that the “crisis in antitrust” that inspired his original critique was over.138
“[T]he paradox suggested by the book’s title,” which concerned antitrust’s
inconsistent premises, “some of them leading to the preservation of
competition and others to its suppression,”139 was resolved in Bork’s mind.
Bork also denounced “antitrust’s ideological drives.”140 Summarizing the
book’s key arguments, Bork wrote: “The argument of this book, of course,
is that competition must be understood as the maximization of consumer
welfare or, if you prefer, economic efficiency.”141
Notwithstanding Bork’s many contributions to antitrust, the introduction
of the “consumer welfare” standard as the goal of U.S. competition laws
established the greatest antitrust paradox yet. Being vague and ambiguous,
136. See generally Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser
Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013); Orbach, supra note 4.
137. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
138. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF ix (rev.
ed. 1993).
139. Id.
140. Id. at x.
141. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
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the standard accommodates inconsistent premises and interpretations.
Utilizing Bork’s own analytical framework and arguments, the
developments in antitrust during the past three decades require restoring
“competition” as the goal of antitrust to resolve the most significant
antitrust paradox today and promote clarity regarding the law.
The debate over the goals of antitrust has been misplaced.142 It is a
debate about a meaning of a phrase that should have never been part of
antitrust discourse. The regulation of competition cannot be expected to be
simplistic and static.
Rather, it ought to nuanced, dynamic, and
imperfect.143 Like other economic concepts, the concept of “competition”
develops over time.144 When Bork described confusion in the perception of
“competition” among courts, he compared perceptions in different eras145
and demanded human judges to demonstrate the precision of a textbook.
His critique of antitrust was not only imprecise, it has also hindered
progress in antitrust.
In United States v. Associated Press,146 Judge Learned Hand wrote:
“Congress has incorporated into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards
of the common law, and by so doing has delegated to the courts the duty of
fixing the standard for each case.”147 The argument infuriated Bork, who
found Hand’s approach equivalent to “tennis with the net down.”148 But
Judge Hand’s practical approach should be reheard.
Antitrust should preserve some degree of flexibility in order to follow
evolving understandings of economics. The controversy over the goals of
antitrust illustrates why past views should be reconsidered. For example, in
the course of the goals controversy, most scholars have probably used the
word “welfare,” although the antitrust methodology does not accommodate
welfare analysis.149 Many antitrust scholars equated consumer welfare and
consumer surplus. And others argued that “consumer welfare” should mean
“social surplus” (an odd interpretation in itself). The concept of surplus as
a measure of economic welfare, however, has never been accepted in
economics.150 Surplus in antitrust analysis may be useful, but the notion

142. See Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013).
143. For a discussion on the complexity and imperfections in regulation, see Barak
Orbach, What Is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1 (2012), http://yale-jreg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Orbach_30.pdf; Barak Orbach, What Is Government Failure?,
31 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2219709.
144. See Hovenkamp, supra note 49.
145. In the epilogue of the revised edition, Bork argued that “courts assured us[ that
competition] meant the preservation or comfort of small businesses, the advancement of first
amendment values, the preservation of political democracy, the preservation of local
ownership, and so on ad infinitum.” BORK, supra note 138, at 427.
146. 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
147. Id. at 370.
148. Bork, supra note 30, at 9–10.
149. See generally Meese, supra note 136; Orbach, supra note 4.
150. See, e.g., John M. Currie et al., The Concept of Economic Surplus and Its Use in
Economic Analysis, 81 ECON. J. 741 (1971); Martin L. Weitzman, Consumer’s Surplus As an
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that a simplistic economic concept could define the goal of antitrust is
somewhat extreme.
As Robert Bork pointed out, “[w]hen we talk of the desirability of
competition we ordinarily have in mind . . . low prices, innovation, choice
among differing products—all things we think of as being good for
consumers.”151 During the first seven decades after the enactment of the
Sherman Act, the preservation of competition was perceived as the most
reasonable and practical end for antitrust. Competition is still the most
reasonable and practical goal for competition laws. As a standard for
competition laws, “competition” is not more confusing or abstract than
“consumer welfare,” which has no particular meaning in antitrust. It is
therefore only logical to restore antitrust’s lost goal. Whatever good ends
the phrase “consumer welfare” may have once served, antitrust law should
now lay it to rest. Of course, the consumer welfare standard may continue
serving as the stated goal of U.S. competition laws but, practically, antitrust
has always been and will always be about the preservation of competition.

Exact Approximation When Prices Are Appropriately Deflated, 103 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1988)
(describing the conditions under which consumer surplus may be useful).
151. BORK, supra note 12, at 61.

